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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the impact of a housing rent inflation cap of 4
per cent on price changes for tenancy contracts. We assess the implications of
the regulations on the share of the market experiencing: 1) a price decline; 2)
unchanged rents (nominal rigidity); 3) a positive growth rate below the cap;
4) the maximum allowable growth; and 5) growth above the cap. Our iden-
tification strategy uses a multinomial logit difference-in-difference approach
applied to a novel micro panel dataset at the property level in Ireland. We
find the overall inflation rate fell by 3 percentage points following the regula-
tions, driven by a reduction in the share of individual contracts pricing above
the regulatory maximum. We find an increase in the likelihood of nominal
rigidity at the expense of high-growth rates. However, we also find a higher
probability of small increases, at or below the regulatory level, relative to
nominal rigidity after the regulations which is consistent with landlords try-
ing to maintain real returns as price resets are not allowed between tenancies.
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1 Introduction
The economic dynamics of price inflation for rental housing has long been complicated by
two aspects of rental markets. The first issue relates to regulatory tenancy rent control
regimes. These regulations have been a common feature of many rental markets globally
since the middle of the 20th century, and have been used extensively in the US and Europe.
The regimes often act to limit price setting behaviour (often distinguishing between new
and current tenants) with a broad policy objective of limiting the exposure of tenants to
price increases set by landlords and therefore improve housing affordability (Lind 2001).
Security of tenure is also often found to be a secondary objective (Haffner et al. 2008). The
research on the costs and benefits of rent control measures is extensive, with considerable
focus placed on issues such as investment and housing quality (Sims 2007, Arnott &
Shevyakhova 2014), community composition (Sims 2011), the impact on unemployment
duration (Svarer et al. 2005), tenancy length (Munch & Svarer 2002) and homelessness
(Early & Olsen 1998). Haffner et al. (2008) also explored the degree to which the balance
of tenant and landlord rights matter for the efficacy of regulations. Diamond et al. (2019)
find that rent controls impact tenant mobility and drive up rents in the long run.
The second issue in housing rental markets is the existence of nominal rigidities where
prices are unchanged for the same property from period to period. This degree of price
stickiness in housing has been linked to tenant turnover costs (Genesove 2003, Aysoy
et al. 2014) and is likely to play a role in determining the degree to which regulations
impact price changes. Importantly, the impact of price rigidities in housing is critical
in terms of the broad debate about price stickiness and the impact of monetary policy
changes. In theory, central bank interventions do not have a full pass through into inflation
because prices do not respond sufficiently quickly (Kehoe & Midrigan 2015) or rigidities
prevent price changes. From the perspective of aggregate changes in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), the impact of monetary changes should be greater if nominal price rigidity
occurs for items which take up a large share of a household budget, like housing costs for
private renters. Indeed, given the high share of the household budget that is allocated to
housing1, the extent of nominal price rigidities in the housing market is a critical aspect
in understanding the transmission of monetary policy and the measurement of inflation
(Ambrose et al. 2017, 2018, Diewert et al. 2009, Dougherty & Van Order 1982).
Despite the extensive literature, there are few studies which directly quantify either
the impact of rent controls on rental price inflation and the degree of nominal rigidity in
the housing market. This paper addresses this gap in the literature. In particular, we
consider the price setting behaviour of landlords across the price distribution after the
adoption of a maximum price cap regulation of 4 per cent. In order to do this, we exploit
a quasi-natural experimental setting before and after the introduction of rent controls in
1Various estimates suggest that renters face high housing costs relative to income internationally.
A summary of the literature can be found in Corrigan et al. (2019) with US examples in Quigley &
Raphael (2004). Dutch examples in Haffner & Boumeester (2014) and the Turkish case in Aysoy
et al. (2014).
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the Republic of Ireland in 2017. As a result of the regulations, certain areas in the country
were classified as rent control areas with other areas remaining unclassified. In the rent
control areas, the rate of nominal rent increases were limited to 4 per cent annually. We use
regulatory micro-data on tenancy agreements in Ireland at the property-level taken from
the supervisory returns collected by the Irish rental regulator, the Residential Tenancies
Board (RTB). For the purpose of this study we extract a property-level panel dataset from
the supervisory database of tenancy agreements which covers the period pre and post the
introduction of the rental regulations in 2017.
More specifically, our first contribution is to explore the impact of rent controls on
rent growth. We assess the impact on the overall inflation rate but go further than the
existing literature to assess the implications of the regulations on the share of the market
experiencing differing growth rates. For example, landlords could opt to set prices: a)
above the 4 per cent maximum; b) at the cap; c)lower than the cap but with positive
growth; d) leave rents unchanged (nominally rigid) or e) reduce rents. Which of these op-
tions they choose is likely to depend on their bargaining power in the market, the ability
to recoup the cost of tenant turnover, and the desire to protect real returns by maximis-
ing the inflation rate. Our research design to identify these effects uses a multinomial
logit difference-in-difference approach which splits the distribution into five groups which
identify whether rents are: 1) falling, 2) remaining the same, 3) growing at less then the
regulatory maximum 4 per cent, 4) growing at the regulatory max, 5) growing above the
regulatory max. We can then test the relative likelihood of being in each of the groups,
as compared to growing above the 4 per cent cap in regulated and unregulated markets
before and after the policies were introduced.
In relation to this contribution, our research is closely linked to a number of studies.
Two recent studies use micro data to explore changes in Germany rent regulations in
2015 (Breidenbach et al. 2019, Mense et al. 2018) with both finding the regulations had
a negative impact on rental inflation. Sims (2007) considered the impact of ending rent
control in Massachusetts. He found that rent control had reduced prices, had little effect on
new construction but had led to a deterioration in the quality of the units. More recently,
Fitzenberger & Fuchs (2017) looked at the impact of rent regulation on prices in Germany
using a quantile regression. Their identification relied on comparing tenancies covered and
uncovered by regulations over time. Oust (2018) found little affect of the removal of rent
control in Oslo on the level of rents but does not focus on the distributional effects or
impacts on the growth rates. By exploiting the quasi-natural geographic variation which
is unlikely to be impacted by omitted tenant variables, and exploring the distributional
effects in more details, our research builds on these studies but explores greater insights.
Indeed, the panel nature of our data improves the identification strategy as well as our
use of the multinomial group comparison. Another notable study is Diamond et al. (2019)
which uses a law change in San Francisco to test the impact of regulation on tenant
mobility and prices levels. As our focus is on the price growth distribution, we feel our
research is complementary to this study.
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Our second contribution is to explore the direct impact of rent controls on nominal
price rigidity. Focusing on the share of rental contracts which do not change prices over
time, and how regulations impact this share, is important given the implications for the
efficacy of tenancy controls as well as the impacts on monetary policy pass through. In
this regard, there are two potential competing hypotheses as to how landlords may react
to the regulations. First, nominal rigidity may rise if landlords are not able to recoup
the cost of tenant turnover. In this case, the cost of losing a tenant due to large rent
increases outweighs the loss in real earnings growth with rises now capped by 4 per cent
increases per annum. The second hypothesis suggests that nominal rigidity may fall if
landlords increase rents by the allowed regulatory level in order to protect real returns.
Disentangling these hypotheses is an empirical question. Our strategy to identify these
behaviours is twofold. First, using probability modelling we test whether the share of zero
growth contracts changes after the introduction of the policies in the treated areas. Second,
we then use a multinomial logit model and compare the probability of price changes in
each of the five aforementioned groups relative to the nominal rigidity (i.e. unchanged
rents) group.
Three previous papers consider the issue of nominal rigidity in housing rents but
none interact this with price controls. Genesove (2003) explored the presence of nominal
rigidity in apartment rents in the US over the period 1974-1981, focusing on areas without
rent controls in operation. He found a high share of properties displayed nominal rigidities
(approximately 30 per cent). Shimizu et al. (2010) considered the stability of the Japanese
CPI during the 1990’s credit boom and focused on the degree of nominal price rigidity
in housing as an explanatory factor. They found that 90 per cent of rents are unchanged
annually and this depends on the level of the rent as compared to the market. Finally,
Aysoy et al. (2014) used a national panel of housing units in Turkey to explore the degree
of nominal rigidity over the period 2008 to 2011. They found that 31.5 per cent of rents
did not change over time and that this was affected by tenant characteristics and search
and moving costs.
While all three of these studies explore aspects of nominal rigidities, they do not test
how the impact of rent regulation affects price setting behaviour. Indeed by altering
the real expected cash flows from the rental unit, rent controls are likely to considerably
change landlords view’s on price setting as well as altering the tenant turnover cost. By
using a quasi-experimental setting for areas before and after their classification as rent
controlled, we can test the degree to which rent controls impact nominal rigidities as well
as the overall inflation rate.
Finally, we explore whether heterogeneous effects are evident across different landlord
and property characteristics. Using our granular data, we explore whether professional
company landlords react differently to individual household landlords. We hypothesize
that differential effects may occur due to differences in the ability to manage the cost
of tenant turnover as well as differences in profit maximising pricing behaviour. Second,
we explore whether the level of the rent, prior, to the regulations affects the subsequent
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pricing. If some landlords had been keeping rents low with a view to increasing them
between tenancies, this is no longer allowable under the regulations and may force them
to begin introducing positive changes. This may alter the impact of the regulations on
nominal rigidity. To our knowledge, neither of these aspects have been explored in the
existing literature.
A number of findings emerge. First, overall rent controls had a deflationary impact on
the market with the inflation rate dropping by approximately 2 percentage points after
the introduction of the regulations. Second, we uncover a considerable fall in the share of
rent price increases above the 4 per cent limit consistent with the regulatory framework.
These findings indicate that the regulations have been broadly effective in lowering the
level of rental inflation in the classified areas. Considering the impact across the price
distribution, we find that, relative to previously setting prices above 4 per cent, landlords
were most likely to price at the regulatory max followed by just below the limit but with
above zero growth.
In relation to the impact of rent controls on nominal rigidity, we find that the share
of zero growth contracts increased after the introduction of the measures. An increase in
no price change contracts may arise due to the risk of tenants leaving after a rent increase
and such costs not being recoupable. Furthermore, the findings of the multinomial logit
estimates present an interesting picture of the impacts of rent controls across the price
distribution. We find that, relative to no change, the likelihood of price increases at, or
just below, 4 per cent has increased after the regulations in the treated areas. This may be
due to landlords attempting to protect the real value of contracts given their inability to
reset rents between tenancies. While the overall effect of the policies has been to dampen
rents, they have also caused inflation at other points in the distribution consistent with a
protection of real return by landlords (a movement from previous unchanged to positive
growth).
We find differences by landlord type with non-professional investors (individual house-
holds) more likely to have nominally rigid rents and also less likely to have increases at,
or below, the maximum allowable. This may be driven by the fact that such households
are unable to absorb tenant turnover costs as easy as professional companies. We also
find that landlords with lower than average rents before the regulations were introduced
are less likely to leave rents unchanged and more likely to grow rents up to the regulatory
maximum after the regulations. If such landlords had left rents low before, with a view
to increases this at tenant turnover, this is no longer allowed. They therefore have to
increase rents close to the maximum to compensate. Overall, we find that, faced with a
common, market-wide regulatory maximum, landlords react heterogeneously to set prices
at different points across the distribution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
rent control legislation and the rental market in Ireland; section 3 presents the data and
summary statistics. Section 4 presents the analysis of the impact of rent controls on rent
inflation. Section 5 considers the interaction between rent controls and nominal rigidity
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and section 6 concludes.
2 Rent Controls and the Rental Market in Ireland
The onset of the 2008 financial crisis in Ireland led to a dramatic fall in house prices and
rents which continued well into 2013. However, from 2014 onwards the economy began
to recover and rental prices began to increase rapidly. A continued fall in unemployment,
coupled with both rising demographic pressures, low housing supply and tighter mort-
gage credit conditions for prospective buyers from 2015 all conspired to put further price
pressure on the private rental market.
In reaction to the growing public pressure over the cost of private rents, the Govern-
ment introduced legislation in late 2016 aimed at limiting the rate of price inflation in
private rental contracts. While rent controls are a feature of many markets internation-
ally, and were used historically in an Irish context, the explicit inflation cap introduced
by these measures represented a marked policy shift for the sector.
The controls were introduced as part of the Planning and Development (Housing) and
Residential Tenancies Act 2016. Under this provision, areas can be designated as Rent
Pressure Zones (RPZs) by the Minister with responsibility for Housing, Planning and
Local Government. This designation limits rental inflation in these areas to a maximum
of 4 per cent annually (in a similar vien to the German 10 per cent cap as outlined in
Deschermeier et al. (2016)). This limit is applied to rents agreed at the start of the tenancy
(i.e. the previous rent on the property, or rent history, is used as the anchor for allowable
rent increase) and to rents reviewed in an ongoing tenancy. Two geographic boundary
areas can be designated as Rent Pressure Zones: Local Electoral Areas (LEAs) or local
authority areas (LAs). At these levels, there are two criteria for determining whether
or not the area can be classified as a rent pressure zone: First, the rent inflation must
have grown at a rate of 7 per cent or more on an annual basis in four of the previous six
quarters. Second, the average rent in the current quarter must be higher than the average
national rent (i.e., the Rent Index national standardised rent).
Two exceptions to the 4 per cent maximum increase are currently allowed in the
legislation. First, properties new to the rental market (i.e. properties without a rent
history for the previous two years relative to when the area in which the property is
located was designated an RPZ) are exempt. Second, properties that have experienced a
substantial change in the nature of the accommodation (i.e. renovations or reforms of such
nature that they involved significant alterations that increased the value of the property)
are also exempted. This provides some incentive for landlords to invest and maintain their
properties which has been a criticism of the rent control regimes in other countries.
In total, five local authority areas and 16 other additional LEAs around the country
have been declared RPZs by Q3 2018 (see Appendix A for details). Most of the current
RPZs were designated between December 2016 and January 2017, although two more
designation rounds have taken place since as a result of applying the criteria described (the
5
Rental Inflation
specific dates of each designation are also provided in a table in Appendix A). Visualisation
of the declared and undeclared areas are presented in the maps in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Areas Classified as Rent Pressure Zones
Greater Dublin Area
Cork City and County
Galway City and County
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data Overview
The data used for this assessment are provided by the RTB, the state regulator for the
Irish private rental sector. By law, all new tenancies in Ireland must be registered on
commencement with the RTB and details of the contract provided. This includes the level
of the rent and characteristics of the dwelling such as number of bedrooms, number of
tenants, address, and other features. The information does not include characteristics of
the tenants. These data have been collected and monitored by the RTB since quarter
3 (Q3) 2007 and a tendancy level database of all newly registered tenancies is available
from that date onwards. This provides a dataset of approximately 1.3 million registered
tenancy agreements from Q3 2007 until Q3 2018. While a majority of the data relate
to new tenancies, some tenancy renewals are also contained in the dataset. Renewed
tenancies are those re-registered with the RTB after they have existed for between 4 and
6 years (Part IV renewals). There is no requirement in Ireland for tenancies to be re-
registered on an annual basis or where the tenancy continues under four years. These
data therefore do not measure the stock of outstanding rental contracts and are more in
line with the data used in Ambrose et al. (2015) to measure the new, repeat, market rental
price.
For the purpose of this research, a specific extract from the database was used. Our
interest was in looking at the degree of price stickiness as well as the impact of rent
controls on price inflation. We therefore required sufficient data at a within-property
level to calculate growth rates. A number of transformations and data cleaning steps are
required. The RTB database does not include a property identifier, which would allow
matching multiple tenancy agreements to one property and calculate property-specific rent
changes over time. The Eircode (i.e. Irish postal code) is the closest approximation to a
property identifier in our dataset, but does not distinguish between properties that might
share the same Eircode (e.g. apartments in the same building complex). We combine
Eircodes with information from the address field in the dataset to match observations to
properties.
We identify 201,500 distinct properties that appear more than once (these properties
are associated with 614,004 tenancy agreements). A property ID is generated for each
of these identified dwellings. With the help of this new ID, we can calculate compound
annual growth rates for each property using the formula:
CAGRit =
(
rentit
rentit−s
)12/(t−s)
− 1 (1)
where s is the time gap between the two tenancy agreements in months. This com-
putation yields 396,251 property-specific growth rates which are used in the econometric
estimations 2.
2We have discarded the 1 per cent of the smallest and largest growth rates to avoid the results
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Once we develop a property level dataset, we can assign each property into LEAs, and,
therefore, identify those properties that are located in RPZs and those that are located
in non-RPZ areas. This provides us with our treatment (RPZ) and control (non-RPZs)
definitions.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Since a number of observations had to be dropped when constructing the property level
dataset, there may be concerns that the data omission induces a selection bias, and issues
concerning the representativeness of the property level dataset. To rule out this concern,
we present summary statistics of the total sample and the reduced property level sample in
Table 1. Since there are not substantial variations between the two datasets, we conclude
that the property level dataset is representative. Most tenancies correspond to two or
three bedroom properties (68 per cent) and nearly half of the registered properties are
apartments. The most frequent tenancy length is between 10 and 12 months. Almost
half of the rental agreements included only one tenant, while a further 35 per cent of
agreements included two tenants. This highlights the high demand for smaller units in
the Irish rental market.
being distorted by outliers as standard.
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Table 1: Property characteristics comparison
Total sample (%) Property sample (%)
1 Bedroom 16.6 15.2
2 Bedrooms 36.9 36.1
3 Bedrooms 31.3 33.7
4 Bedrooms 12.8 12.7
5+ bedrooms 2.4 2.2
Apartment 44.0 42.5
Detached 10.2 5.8
Semi-detached 25.1 29.3
Terrace 14.2 16.7
Other property 6.4 5.7
Part house 1.4 1.0
1 Tenant 47.6 45.4
2 Tenants 35.5 36.4
3 Tenants 7.7 8.4
4+ Tenants 6.5 7.4
1-6 months tenancy 8.2 8.3
7-9 months tenancy 4.7 4.4
10-12 months tenancy 66.4 67.6
1+ year tenancy 20.7 19.8
Fortnightly rent 0.2 0.3
Monthly rent 86.9 88.7
Yearly rent 1.3 1.0
Quarterly rent 0.1 0.0
To compare rental price inflation in Ireland across the price distribution as well as
across RPZ and non-RPZ areas, we present a number of comparisons. Figure 2 presents
the mean and median price growth in the sample over the period 2007-2018. To contextual
the price distribution, we also include the interquartile range and p10-p90 spread which
provides insight into the degree of price dispersion and the variance in growth rates in
the market. In the period 2007 through 2012, rental prices were falling rapidly as the
Irish economy suffered an extreme financial and economic crisis, a major cause of which
was imbalances in the housing and credit markets (Honohan et al. 2010, McCarthy &
McQuinn 2017). In this period of deflation, and in particular in 2010 at the height of the
crisis, it is noteworthy that even at the top end of the distribution, prices were not rising
or only rising modestly. This highlights the scale of the downturn in the property market.
Towards mid-2013, rental prices began to recover with both the mean and median growth
rate turning positive.
From 2014 onwards, as the Irish economy began to grow rapidly, rental prices also
recovered strongly and this precipitated a period of rapidly growing rents from 2015-2018.
While the mean and median growth rates had been hovering around 6-9 per cent over the
period 2014-2016, it is noteworthy that the share of rapidly growing rents had increased
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(as noted by an expansion in the share of interquartile range and p10-p90 above the mean
and median). Since the end of 2016, and the introduction of rent controls, the share of
rents at the high end of the distribution has fallen.
Figure 2: Rent Inflation Growth Distributions - Trend 2007-2018
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Mean Median
Source: Authors calculations using RTB data .
The first objective of this paper is to explore the impact of rent price regulation on the
rental inflation rate. To set up this analysis, comparing price trends in the treated and
control areas can provide important preliminary evidence as to how such rules impacted
the market. To provide more granular insight into price developments and their interaction
with the introduction of rent controls, in Figure 3 we present the mean and median rental
growth rate for areas classified since 2016 as rent pressure zones and the non-classified
areas.
Figure 3 A presents the mean growth rates while Figure 3 B presents the median growth
rates. The relative trend in the means appear to be similar across both RPZ and non-RPZ
areas, up until 2016 when the regulations came into force. This includes a similar period
of deflation and recovery. The recovery appears to be somewhat stronger in the RPZ areas
which, to date, mainly cover the urban centres and commuting towns. Given the structure
of the Irish economy, with rapidly growing urban economic activity, this is unsurprising.
Since 2016, price inflation has moderated in the RPZ areas but continued to rise elsewhere.
A similar picture emerges in the median inflation rate. These data appear to suggest a
common path between the two areas, albeit with different levels of inflation. This common
path breaks down at the same time as rent pressure zones were introduced suggesting a
correlation between the rent controls and changing price dynamics. We formally test these
dynamics in the next section.
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Figure 3: Growth Rate Trends in Treatment and Control Areas
(a) Figure 3 A: Mean Comparison
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(b) Figure 3 B: Median Comparison
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A second objective of this paper is to consider the impact of rent controls on the degree
of nominal rigidity in rental prices, and in order to do so, we turn our attention to the
price distribution. In this context, we define nominal rigidity as contracts where there is no
change in the annualised rent as in previous studies. To illustrate the change in the rental
price distribution before and after the introduction of RPZ legislation, Figure 4 presents
the percentage of contracts across the price distribution for each 1 per cent of the growth
distribution. We have censored the data at growth rates plus or minus 30 per cent for
illustration. The time period presented is from Q2 2015 - Q3 2018 which is split into the
periods before and after the introduction of rent controls. The classification is time varying
so that, within the period Q2 2015 - Q3 2018, each observation is classified into the RPZ
group at the point when each area was designated as an RPZ. Both the treated (RPZ)
and non-treated (non-RPZ) areas are presented separately thus highlighting the temporal
variation within each area. Figure 4 suggests that even before the introduction of the RPZ
legislation, a high degree of nominal rigidity existed in the data with approximately 15 per
cent of RPZ areas not changing their rental levels and 30 per cent in the non-RPZ areas.
After the introduction of rent controls, the share of nominal rigidity rose in RPZ areas to
just under 20 per cent with no discernible change in the non-RPZ areas. Of note also is
the bunching at 4 per cent in the RPZ areas after the introduction of rent controls. This is
the legislative allowable increase for contracts in these areas. Given the data, it could be
the case that the 4 per cent is acting as an anchor effect which reinforces the point that the
parameterisation matters: growth rates are drawn to this point. These patterns are not
evident in the control areas. It is also noteworthy that the share of growth rates between
0 and 4 have increased after the legislation was introduced. As the Irish regulations are
first generation rent controls, in the sense that no reset is allowed between tenants3, this
may have increased the share of landlords increasing rents to ensure they maintain real
3First generation rent controls refer to a situation where the property is covered by the regula-
tions and even if a tenant changes, rent increases are linked to the previous rent. Second generation
controls relate to the protection of the tenant from rent increases. These allow increases to market
rates if the tenant changes.
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returns (setting the price growth as high above inflation as possible).
Figure 4: Growth Rate Distributions - Before and After RPZs
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(b) Control Group
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A final comparison that we present is the cross sectional variation for the two areas for
each time point. Figure 5 presents the distribution for RPZ and non-RPZ areas separately.
Before the treatment, the degree of nominal rigidity was higher in the non-RPZ areas and
there were fewer incidences of rental growth at the high end of the distribution. However, in
the post-treatment period there are now more high growth rents in the non-treated areas.
We can again see the increase in rents in and around 4 per cent that was documented
previously.
Figure 5: Growth Rate Distributions - Treatment and Control LEAs
(a) After 2017
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Figures 4 and 5 presented in this sub-section suggest that the introduction of rent
controls in Ireland had different effects across the price distribution and potentially on the
degree of nominal rigidity. We formally examine these patterns in the following sections.
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4 How do Rent Controls Impact Inflation Rates?
We begin our empirical examination of the impact of rent controls on price inflation by
exploring the direct effect of the treatment on the growth rate in the areas of Ireland
that were declared RPZs. We first outline our identification strategy then present the
results of our overall estimates and then subsequently undertake some estimates across
the distribution of rental growth.
4.1 Identification Strategy
To identify the effects of rent controls on the level of rental inflation across the growth
distribution, we test two different hypotheses. Our first a priori expectation is that the
inflation rate should fall after the introduction of the rules. This is captured by the
following hypothesis:
H1: The inflation rate will be lower in the designated areas after the introduction of the
regulations.
To test this hypothesis, we use a standard difference-in-difference fixed effects model
to test for the average treatment effect on the treated i.e. the change in the inflation rate
following the introduction of rent controls. The specification is as follows;
∆Rijt = α+ βRPZjt + γLEAj + τt + x′ijtδ + ijt (2)
where ∆Rijt is the annualised change in the rent of property i in time t in local
electoral area j. This is determined as a function of an RPZ dummy, which is a time
and LEA varying binary indicator which is 1 if an area has been classified as an RPZ
and zero in other time periods. To saturate out the time varying effects and the area
specific effects, we then include LEA level fixed effects, (LEAj), and time fixed effects
(τt).4 Time fixed effects include month dummies and year dummies. We then include
a vector of property-level control variables in a similar vein to a hedonic regression to
standardise the growth rates across property types. The variables included in this vector
are: the number of bedrooms, the number of tenants, the tenancy length, and the housing
type (apartment, detached house, semi-detached house, terrace, other). As the dependent
variable is a compound annual average growth rate, the periods across which the growth
rates are potentially different. We therefore include three variables to capture the time gap
between the observations in the panel. We include the log and level of the time gap and
the time gap squared as control variables.5 Given our specification, we would therefore
expect that β < 0 and is statistically significant
4We also run additional specifications which include a property-level fixed effect and the results
are identical to those with the higher level fixed effects. Results are available on request from the
authors.
5The results are not sensitive to the functional form or the set of controls included for the time
gap. Other specifications can be provided as requested from the authors.
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The Irish rent control regulation limits annualised rent increases to 4 per cent, however
there are several reasons as to why rent in certain properties might still be growing above
the limit. First, the regulation allows a number of specific exemptions from the rent cap, as
discussed previously, and landlords are allowed to raise prices on a pro-rata basis. Second,
it is possible that non-compliance might be eroding rent inflation reductions enforced
by the RPZs declaration. The property level dataset used in this analysis allows us to
calculate the share of tenancy agreements with more than 4 per cent annual rent growth,
and therefore provide insights into how many agreements are transacting in, around or
above the 4 per cent legal threshold.
Our second a priori expectation is that the set up of the regulations should reduce the
share of growth rates over 4 per cent:
H2: Share of properties with a growth rate above 4 per cent will decline
This hypothesis provides a direct test of how effective the regulations have been in
meeting their central objective of reducing growth rates above the 4 per cent cap. To test
this proposition, we define an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if ∆Rijt > 4%
and 0 otherwise. This variable is regressed as a function of the RPZ dummy as previously
defined, LEA fixed effects, time fixed effects and the control vector:
Pr (∆Rijt > 4%) = f
(
α+ βRPZjt + γLEAj + τt + x′ijtδ
)
(3)
Again, we would expect that β < 0.6
4.2 Testing for Average Effects
In this sub-section we empirically test H1. For this purpose, we estimated a series of
rental growth regressions to determine the impact of the introduction of rent controls on
the average rental growth rate, as presented in equation (4). We include the main RPZjt
indicator which varies by LEA and time, picking up the changing classification over time of
the different areas. We saturate the specifications with year, month and LEA fixed effects
as well as time gap controls. These controls ensure that the common trends over time as
well as the LEA specific time invariant heterogeneity is removed thus allowing the RPZ
coefficient to pick up the average effect of RPZ status on the areas after classification. We
also include variables capturing the duration of the tenancy, the number of tenants, the
number of rooms in the property, the type of housing (with apartment being the omitted
group) and a control for whether the lease was a new or renewal agreement. These variables
should capture variation in the growth rates across different property types.
A standard challenge in impact studies such as these is determining the time window
to be used before and after the policy. The measures in Ireland were introduced in late
December 2016 and in effect began to operationally impact the Irish market from January
6As would be the marginal effect if a non-linear model is used in estimation.
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2017 onwards. Taking the time period following the onset of the regulations for which we
have data, this leaves a window of 7 quarters between Q1 2017 and Q3 2018. Our main
comparison that we undertake is to use a symmetric time window thus 7 quarters before
and after the policy intervention, Q2 2015-Q3 2018. However, to ensure that our estimates
are not affected by the selection of the time window we also expand our analysis to cover
the period Q1 2010 to Q3 2018 as a check. Another consideration is that the legislation in
Ireland only applies to those properties which have a rent history for the past 24 months.
We therefore limit our sample into two groups: the first are all properties and the second
are those properties for which we have data to estimate a growth rate within the past two
years. The latter should be more affected by the regulations. The results are presented
in Table 2. In columns (1) and (2) we present the estimates for the full sample for the
broad and short time windows. In columns (3) and (4) we present the estimates for the
restricted sample where the properties were re-leased within a 24 month window.
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Table 2: Testing for Average Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenantsijt 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
TenancyLengthijt -0.000+ -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NoofRoomsijt 0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PT : Detijt -0.001 -0.005∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
PT : SemiDetijt -0.001 -0.002 0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
PT : Terraceijt -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗ 0.002∗ 0.006+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
PT : Otherijt -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
RPZjt -0.026∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 362,391 149,884 169,704 52,296
From Q1 2010 Q2 2015 Q1 2010 Q2 2015
To Q3 2018 Q3 2018 Q3 2018 Q3 2018
Sample All All <=24month <=24month
LEA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In all four specifications, the RPZ dummy is negative and significant at the 0.1 per
cent level. These results indicate a statistically significant reduction in rent inflation
after the introduction of the regulations. The magnitude of the effect varies across the
specifications. In the shorter time window, the coefficient is circa -2 percentage points for
the larger sample and -3 percentage points for the 24 month window sample. The wider
time widow coefficients indicate effects of -2.6 and -4.3 percentage points respectively.
A critical question in terms of understanding the economic magnitude of these findings
is to explore how large these estimates are given the prevailing inflation rates in the market
prior to the onset of the regulations. Given that the regulations were introduced as a
reaction to high rental inflation in the period 2015 and 2016, we consider the impact
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for this time period. The results of simple calculations are presented in Table 3. The
average inflation rate for all properties from Q2 2015 to the onset of the regulations in
each LEA was approximately 7 per cent. The estimate coefficient of -0.02 suggest a 28
per cent reduction in the inflation rate from 7 per cent to approximately 5 per cent. The
equivalent figures for this time period using the 24 month window sample are 10 per
cent with a coefficient of -0.03 indicating again a 28 per cent moderation in the inflation
rate. Both of these effects suggest a material reduction in the inflation rate following the
introduction of rent controls.
Table 3: Impacts on Inflation Rate, Q3 2015-classification
(1) All properties (2) <= 24 month sample
Mean∆Rijt 7% 10%
β -2% -3%
Effect = βMean∆Rijt -28% -28%
4.3 Testing the Impact of Equilibrium Convergence
One issue that could be confounding our identification strategy relates to the fact that
the specific areas where the regulations were introduced were set as rent pressure zones
specifically due to the level of rents being high in these areas. In these areas, the rate of
growth may have been slowing before the regulations solely due to the fact that in these
markets the growth rates were converging to their local equilibrium (having potentially
grown rapidly in the period prior to the introduction to the regulations). While an ideal
way to control for this would be to find some source of exogenous variation which would
allow us to purge the estimates of these biases, we have not been able to find such variation
in our data. As an alternative, we run a range of robustness checks. First, we simply
control for the level of rent (in lagged form) to test whether the effect of the RPZ dummy
is dependent on the initial level of the rent. Second, we introduce a disequilibrium term
into the rental growth regression which allows each specific rental growth price to be a
function of how far the initial average is from the market average. The specification is as
follows:
∆Rijt = α+ βRPZjt + γLEAj + τt + x′ijtδ + ω
[
Rijt−1 − ¯Rjt−1
]
+ ijt (4)
where Rijt−1 is the level of the rental contract i in LEA j in period t-1 and ¯Rjt−1 is the
average inflation rate in LEA j in period t-1. Given our panel data are unbalanced, the
lagged figure refers to the previous period in which that rental property is observed. The
number of observations falls in this case. The parameter ω should capture the degree to
which each rental growth rate is converging at a slower or faster rate due to how much it
deviates from the local market conditions. For brevity, we run this specification for only
the limited sample as in column (4) of table 3 which also ensure the lagged controls are
within 24 months of the dependent variable. The results are presented in table ??. Column
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(1) reproduces the estimate without controls for comparison purposes. Columns (2) and
(3) include the new proposed controls. It is clear across all the specifications that the
main RPZ effect is negative, statistically significant and similar in magnitude regardless
of the control. We are therefore reasonably confident that the findings are not affected by
this specific source of potential bias. We therefore proceed without these controls for the
rest of the analysis.7
Table 4: Controlling for Disequilibrium Effects
(1) (2) (3)
RPZjt -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rijt−1 -0.161∗∗∗
(0.004)[
Rijt−1 − ¯Rjt−1
]
-0.162∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 52296 39294 39294
Standard errors in parentheses
Property type controls and fixed effects included.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.4 Exploring Growth Rates Above 4%
The previous section documents a fall in the inflation rate following the introduction of
the rent controls. Given the parameterisation of the regulations, this effect is likely to
be driven by a reduction in the share of growth rates above the allowable 4 per cent
increase in rents, as was proposed in H2. However, given the possibility for landlords to
use exemptions or due to non-compliance, there are still cases where rental inflation above
4 per cent is allowable thus the actual impact is an empirical question. To test these
dynamics, we estimate a linear probability model with the dependent variable set as 1 if
the property level growth rate was greater than 4 per cent. We estimate the model for the
four samples presented in Table 2, using differing time frames and lease change lengths.
The estimates are presented in Table 5 in columns (1) through (4).
7Estimates including these data are available from the authors on request.
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Table 5: Growth Rates Above 4 Per Cent, Linear Probability Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenantsijt 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
TenancyLengthijt -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NoofRoomsijt -0.001 -0.006∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
PT : Detijt -0.032∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
PT : SemiDetijt -0.027∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.014∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
PT : Terraceijt -0.028∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
PT : Otherijt -0.028∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
RPZjt -0.150∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 362,391 149,884 169,704 52,296
From Q1 2010 Q2 2015 Q1 2010 Q2 2015
To Q3 2018 Q3 2018 Q3 2018 Q3 2018
Sample All All <=24month <=24month
LEA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Across all specifications, the share of properties with growth rates above 4 per cent
fell dramatically. Focusing on the findings in columns (2) and (4) covering the short
time widow, we find that for all properties the impact is a 16 per cent reduction in the
probability of having a rental growth rate above 4 per cent. The figure for the 24 month
sample, the more appropriate comparison from a regulatory compliance perspective, is
22 per cent. Across all estimates, the coefficients are statistically significant at the 0. 1
per cent level. These findings indicate a strong impact of the regulations on the share of
properties whose rent is growing at above 4 per cent. In relation to the other covariates,
the findings suggest that the probability of having rental growth rates above 4 per cent
is increasing with the number of tenants, decreasing with the number of bedrooms and
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higher for apartments (the omitted group) than for other property types. The latter finding
likely reflects the strong excess demand pressures in urban areas where the majority of
apartment housing stock is located in Ireland.
4.5 So where did all the high growth rates go?
It is clear from the preceding sections that the rate of overall rental inflation moderated
in the Irish market, driven by a reduction in growth rates above 4 per cent, following the
introduction of tenancy rent controls. However, to understand the impact of the policies on
the distribution of rental prices it is noteworthy to explore what price growth did landlords
set after the policies, as it is not clear from Figure 4(a) that they all reduced to exactly
the regulatory allowable maximum. Indeed, landlords price setting behaviour is likely to
be affected by a number of factors such as profit maximising behaviour in maximise real
returns (price growth above inflation), the probability of tenant turnover given the price
increase and the ability to recoup the cost of turnover. Given the Irish regulations, and
the fact that rents cannot be reset between tenancies except by the allowable 4 per cent
per annum, the cost of tenant turnover becomes more difficult to recoup.
Within these parameters, landlords have the following pricing options after the regula-
tions: 1) reduce rents; 2) leave rents unchanged; 3) increase rents by less than 4 per cent;
or 4) increase rents by 4 per cent. To explore, which of these pricing points were chosen
by landlords, we conduct an analysis where we separate out the rental growth distribution
into 5 segments as defined by variable Y(R) in Table 6.
Table 6: Spliting the rental distribution
Y(R) Rental Change Group
1 ∆Rijt < 0
2 ∆Rijt = 0
3 0 < ∆Rijt < 4
4 ∆Rijt = 4
5 ∆Rijt > 4
Splitting the distribution in this manner allows us to consider the rental changes in
a multinomial sense. In other words, we can test the relative probability of a landlord
choosing to price in other parts of the distribution, relative to the base case of above 4
per cent. The shares of growth rates split into these categories are presented in Figure 6
for the period Q2 2015 - Q3 2018, split out before and after the policies for the treatment
and control groups. Focusing on the treated area, it is clear that there was a reduction
in the share of growth rates above 4 per cent. This group is not eliminated completely as
the regulations contain allowable exemptions for properties not previously rented or which
underwent substantial renovation. There will also be some growth rate above 4 per cent
if landlords did not increase the rent in the previous year as they are allowed accumulate
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on a pro-rata basis. The fall in the share above 4 per cent is concurrent with a rise in
growth rates at 0, between 0 and 4 and at 4 per cent suggesting that landlords have priced
differently across the distribution due to the regulations being introduced.
Figure 6: Growth Rate Distributions - Treatment and Control LEAs
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4.5.1 A multinomial logit model across the distribution
To explore where across the price distribution landlords decided to set prices after the
regulations, we use a multinomial logit model to explore the relative probability of pricing
in each of the buckets as compared the above 4 per cent (our base category). Using a
multinomial logit allows us to estimate relative risk ratios which provide the odds of any
category relative to a base, and can be depicted in the following identity considering the
relative probabilities as:
pij =
exp(xiβj)∑m
l=1 exp(xiβl)
.....j = 1, ..,m. (5)
where xi are case specific regressors of which their are M cases. The model ensures
that the sum of the probabilities across m cases is equal to 1, ∑ml=1 pij = 1. The model is
identified by setting a base case with 0 as parameters and each other category is compared
to this case. In our model the explanatory variables will, as before, be:
βRPZjt + γLEAj + τt + controls (6)
where the controls are the time gap and hedonic regressors previously outlined.
The results are presented in Table 7. Two specifications are presented covering the
period Q2 2015 - Q3 2018; the first includes all properties and the second only includes
those properties whose we observe twice within a 24 month period. The latter are those
who would certainly have a rent history and be in scope of the regulations. In each case,
we present only the coefficient of the difference-in-difference interaction effect, RPZjt. All
specifications include fixed effects for LEA, month and year as well as the time gap and
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hedonic controls discussed earlier.8 In column (1), all relative risk ratios are statistically
significant at the 0.01 per cent level and positive. This suggests that landlords were more
likely to price in all other points of the distribution relative to above 4 per cent after the
regulations. While it is unsurprising that landlords are more likely to set prices at 4 per
cent, it is somewhat surprising to see landlords are more likely to set 0 growth or lower
rents relative to the above 4 per cent. Looking at column (2) which the relative odds of
the growth rate being set at 4 per cent are seven times greater than above 4 per cent
after the regulations. However, with a relative risk ratio of 1.87 (1.64) suggesting the odds
are 86 per cent higher for this category than the above 4 per cent after the regulations.
The findings from this section are clear: faced with a common, market-wide regulatory
maximum, landlords react heterogeneously and set prices at different points across the
distribution.
Table 7: Where have the high growth rates gone? MNL Relative Risk Ratios
All Relative Risk Ratios from Variable RPZjt
(1) (2)
∆Rijt < 0 2.106∗∗∗ 1.644∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.125)
∆Rijt = 0 1.671∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.088)
0 < ∆Rijt < 4 2.133∗∗∗ 4.219∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.343)
∆Rijt = 4 2.475∗∗∗ 7.038∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.611)
∆Rijt > 4 Base Base
(.) (.)
Observations 149,884 52,296
From Q2 2015 Q2 2015
To Q3 2018 Q3 2018
Sample All <= 24Months
LEA FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
8Results for these variables are available on request.
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5 Rent Controls and the Degree of Nominal Rigid-
ity
Having explored the effect of rent controls on price inflation in the Irish private rental
sector, we now examine the degree to which rent controls impact nominal price rigidity in
rental housing. The above section showed that some landlords were more likely to leave
prices unchanged relative to having high growth rates after the regulations which suggests
changed dynamics in relation to nominal rigidities. Given the multinomial estimates are
relative probabilities, they do not however tell us whether there was a statistically signifi-
cant change in the overall share of nominally rigid rents after the regulations. This overall
level is of critical importance to market dynamics as well as the functioning of monetary
policy.
5.1 Did Nominal Rigidity Change?
The impact of rent controls on the degree of price stickiness are potentially ambiguous
from a theoretical point of view. Landlords’ behaviour will depend on aspects such as the
degree of excess demand or supply in the market, the parameters of the regulations or any
exemptions that are allowable. The Irish regulations can be considered first generation
rent controls, because they do not allow a reset of rent amounts between tenants (i.e.
rents charged to new tenants must also comply with the 4 per cent growth cap). Given
this feature, and the fact that the allowable increase in real terms is under 3 per cent9, it
may incentivise landlords who previously did not change rents to build in price increases
to ensure the real return remains intact over time. Therefore it may reduce the share of
nominal rigidity as landlords build in small but legal increases. Alternatively, landlords
may choose not to increase rents, as the costs of tenant turnover (a key determinant of
nominal ridigity as shown by Aysoy et al. (2014)) are not recoupable and therefore the risk
of tenant exit is not compensated by the marginal increases. This leads to the specification
of two alternative hypotheses that can be tested empirically:
H3a: Nominal rigidity declines after rent controls as landlords protect real returns by
increasing rent to the regulatory limit allowed.
H3b: Nominal rigidity increases after rent controls as the cost of tenant turnover is not
recoupable.
To test these hypotheses, we first explore changes in the share of zero growth rents
before and after rent control implementation. Unchanged rents are assumed to be a proxy
for increased nominal rigidity (i.e. if the share of unchanged contracts increases, nominal
rigidity increased). We specify the following empirical model:
9At the time of writing the Irish CPI was increasing on an annual basis by 1.1 per cent, leaving
the annual real allowable return at 2.9 per cent. See www.cso.ie for details.
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Pr (∆Rijt = 0%) = f
(
α+ βRPZjt + γLEAj + τt + ΩXijt
)
(7)
Where the dependent variable is a binary indicator which takes the value of 1 if the
rental growth was zero on an annualised basis and zero otherwise (Shimizu et al. 2010).
This variable is regressed on the RPZ dummy, LEA and time fixed effects, and the vector
of property type, tenants and lease duration controls described in the previous section.
The coefficient on the RPZ dummy will provide insight into whether nominal rigidity
increased following the introduction of rent controls in Ireland. The results of estimating
equation (7) by linear probability OLS is presented in Table 8. In column (1), we focus
on the broader sample including all properties with the estimates for the narrow group of
properties (<=24 months) presented in column (2). We find that the impact of the RPZ
status on the probability of nominal rigidity is positive and significant. This means that
the share of properties whose rent did not change increased following the introduction
of the rental measures. This finding supports H3b, which proposes that nominal rigidity
would increase following the intervention. One potential economic reason why this might
be the case is that, given the cost of turning over tenants is not recoupable, this lowers
the likelihood that a landlord will raise the rent and thus risk a potential tenant exit.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggest that being in a RPZ increases the probability
of nominal rigidity by 2.1 or 3.7 percentage points. Given there were approximately 20
per cent of zero growth rents in treated areas before the policy intervention, the economic
impact of the policies suggests an increase of about 11-18 percent which is sizeable.
Table 8: Probability of Nominal Rigidity - Marginal Effects
(1) (2)
RPZjt 0.021∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Observations 149,884 52,296
From Q2 2015 Q2 2015
To Q3 2018 Q3 2018
Sample All <= 24Months
LEA FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.2 AMultinomial Approach and Changes to Nominal Rigid-
ity
While we find that nominal rigidity went up after the introduction of the regulations,
given heterogeneous responses to the regulations by landlords facing varying incentives,
it could be the case that both H3a and H3b above are occurring. This situation would
arise if some landlords are moving from no change in rents to small increases to protect
real returns, while others are keeping rents static to reduce the cost of tenant loss. In this
regard, Figure 5 showed that the share of landlords increasing rents by above 4 per cent
fell and Section 4.5 suggested they were pricing right across the distribution.
To test the potential concurrence of both channels in more detail, we draw on the
multinomial logit approach previously outlined. For this section, our approach is identical
except that we set the base category to that of no change in rents (nominal rigidity) and
compare each of the other categories to this base. In terms of coefficient interpretation,
again, we present the exponentiated coefficients which can be interpreted as relative risk
ratios (i.e. values of greater than one indicate a higher likelihood of being in a category
than the base case and values lower than one indicate a lower risk). In terms of covariates,
we include the full set of controls as per equation (4). This includes the LEA dummies,
the time dummies and the critical RPZ indicator varying by LEA and time.
The multinomial logit estimates are presented in Table 9. Since our focus is on com-
paring the relative probabilities between groups before and after the treatment, Table 9
displays the estimated relative risk ratios for the RPZ difference-in-difference parameter
only. Our findings are interpreted as the relative difference in the odds of being in a com-
parison group relative to the base group. Values less than one indicate a lower odds of
being in the comparison group whereas values above one indicate a higher risk of being in
the comparison group. Two specifications are presented for all properties and those within
24 months, as before.
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Table 9: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates - Relative Risk Ratios
All Relative Risk Ratios from Variable RPZjt
(1) (2)
∆Rijt < 0 1.260∗∗∗ 0.876
(0.061) (0.071)
∆Rijt = 0 1.000 1.000
(.) (.)
0 < ∆Rijt < 4 1.276∗∗∗ 2.249∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.199)
∆Rijt = 4 1.481∗∗∗ 3.751∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.351)
∆Rijt > 4 0.598∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.025)
Observations 149,884 52,296
From Q2 2015 Q2 2015
To Q3 2018 Q3 2018
Sample All <= 24Months
LEA FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We focus on the relative risk ratio for ∆Rijt < 0 which compares the likelihood of
rents remaining constant relative to rents falling. For the RPZ dummy the relative risk
ratio is greater than one in the broader specification and less than one, but statistically
insignificant, in the second. As column (1) contains properties that are outside of the scope
of the regulations, it is likely the estimates in column (2) are a more accurate measure
of the effects. This suggests no statistical difference between the likelihood of having a
reduction in rents relative to nominal rigidity after rent controls were introduced.
Focusing on the relative risk ratio for 0 < ∆Rijt < 4, this statistic compares the
probability of having a rent rise of just below 4 per cent relative to rents remaining constant
in nominal terms. In this case the RPZ dummy is positive and statistically significant at
the 0.1 per cent level. This suggests that after rent controls were introduced, rents were
more likely to rise at rates below 4 per cent, relative to remaining unchanged in nominal
terms. The coefficient magnitude indicates the relative risk as nearly 2.5 times higher after
treatment (for the narrower specification). This finding is mirrored in estimates presented
one row below which compares the relative risk of nominal rigidity versus an increase of 4
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per cent, the maximum allowable under the rent restrictions. Again, in this specification
the RPZ dummy is statistically significant and positive. The magnitude indicates that
rents were 3.75 times more likely to increase at 4 per cent relative to being unchanged
after the policy implementation. These two findings suggest that rent growth restrictions
have had an inflationary effect, and have increased the likelihood that rents would rise at
or below 4 per cent relative to remain unchanged post-treatment.
The final set of estimates displayed present the relative risk of a rent increase of above
4 per cent relative to no change. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.1 per
cent level and is lower than one. With a relative risk ratio of 0.53, this suggests that rents
are nearly twice as likely to remain unchanged relative to increasing at above 4 per cent
after the regulations. This estimate is in line with our previous finding that the share of
contracts with growth rates above 4 per cent decreased. This evidence suggests that at
least some of these agreements that were growing at above 4 per cent annually correspond
to cases where the rents stayed unchanged after rent controls were implemented.
Overall, the multinomial logit estimates present an interesting picture of the impacts
of rent controls across the price distribution relative to nominal rigid prices. They indicate
that, in line with estimates in Section 4.4, the share of high inflation rents above 4 per
cent decreased post-implementation of rent controls, with unchanged rental agreements
being more likely. This indicates an increase in the share of nominal rigidity at this region
of the rent growth distribution. However, the estimates also show that, although the
share of nominally rigid agreements (i.e. zero growth) increased post-implementation, the
regulations have increased the share of contracts with inflation at or below the regulatory
limit relative to no change. This may indicate that some landlords are more likely to
increase, relative to leaving them unchanged, in an effort to protect the real value of
contracts. This can be driven by their inability to reset rents outside the regulations in
future. While the overall effect of the policies has been to reduce rent growth, they have
also led to some inflationary pressure up to the regulatory maximum, which is consistent
with a protection of real returns.
5.3 Exploring Heterogeneous Effects by Landlord Type and
Initial Rent
Findings in previous sections point towards heterogeneous effects across different landlords,
depending on their circumstances and the supply, demand dynamics in their local market
and with their tenant. To provide a more detailed insight into the behaviour of landlords,
we exploit the rich micro dataset to gain a better understanding of which landlords may
react differently. Two characteristics that we exploit are 1) whether the landlord is a
company or an individual household, and 2) the level of the initial rent prior to the
regulations being introduced.
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5.3.1 Do the Effects Differ by Landlord Type?
We begin our assessment of the heterogeneous effects by looking at the type of landlord.
Our data provides information on whether the landlord is a company or an individual.10
We use these data to test whether the impact on nominal rigidity, using the simple prob-
ability model and multinomial logit approach, differ for landlords relative to companies.
In our data, as outlined in Table 10, approximately 13 per cent of the observations are
accounted for by landlords (in Appendix B we present the data for the treatment and
control groups separately).
Table 10: Data Split: Companies and Individual Households
Landlord Type Freq. Percent Cum.
Individual 45,400 87.39 87.39
Company 6,551 12.61 100.00
Total 51,951 100.00
Note: Time period is Q2 2015-Q3 2018.
There are a number of reasons to think that companies might react differently. First,
if the landlord is a private individual, they may be managing only a single (or at least
limited) number of housing units. Therefore, it is more costly for them to carry the cost of
changing tenants. They may also be have a lower level of financial knowledge and not be
as well placed to make optimal financial decisions as compared to a professional company
who are likely to have trained finance staff. Given this intuition, our a priori hypothesis
is that companies are less likely to keep prices nominally rigid after the regulations, and
more likely to price at the regulatory maximum as compared to individuals. Individuals
may also have built up a personal relationship with the tenant and this may affect their
pricing decisions.
10When registering with the RTB, the landlord is required to provide either a company registra-
tion number if they are a commercial operation or a personal household social security number. We
can use these data to split the landlords between commercial companies and individual households.
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Figure 7: Growth Rate Distributions - Treatment Areas by Landlord Type
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Indeed, the histogram for the five growth categories across companies and individuals
after rent controls were implemented provides suggestive evidence of differences. Individual
landlords appear to have a higher share of nominal rigidity, while companies appear to have
a higher share of growth rates at or above 4 per cent. We therefore explore whether these
patterns hold in a difference-in-difference setting. We test the following two hypotheses:
H4a: Nominal rigidity increased more for individual landlords after the regulations.
H4b: Companies are more likely to set growth at the regulatory maximum than individual
landlords.
To test these hypotheses, we first re-estimate the probit model outlined in equation 7
including both a dummy for company as well as an interaction effect between the RPZ
difference-in-difference parameter and the company dummy. This allows us to identify
whether the impact of the regulations differed between companies and individuals. The
results are displayed in Table 11. We first present the overall RPZ difference-in-difference
parameter and then its interaction with company. Secondly, we present the marginal effect
at the mean of RPZ for individuals and companies separately. We find a statistically
significant and positive overall effect with a magnitude of 0.04, as before. However, we
also find the interaction is negative and significant with a magnitude of 0.03, indicating
that while nominal rigidities increased after the regulations, the effect for companies was
3 percentage points lower than the overall effect. In fact looking at the marginal effect
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at the means for each group, while individual landlords had a positive 4 percentage point
increase in nominal rigidities, there was no statistically significant effect for companies.
This suggests the increase in nominal rigidities after the regulations was driven by non-
professional landlords, which supports hypothesis H4a.
Table 11: Impact on Nominal Rigidity by Landlord Type
Coefficients from Interactions
RPZjt 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007)
RPZjt × Company -0.030∗∗
(0.011)
Marginal Effects for Groups (At Means)
MFX of RPZjt for:
Individual 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007)
Company 0.011
(0.011)
Observations 51,950
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We now present the multinomial logit estimates obtained after including the interaction
between the difference-in-difference and the company indicator. Again, relative risk ratios
are presented in Table 12. The interpretation of the new interaction term included is that
it increases or lowers the overall effect captured by the main RPZ dummy (if less than one,
the effect is lower, if greater than one, the effect is higher). The estimates indicate that
there is no difference for companies and individuals between the nominal rigidity group and
falling rents and rental growth between 0 and 4 per cent categories. However, companies
are significantly more likely to set growth rates at the regulatory maximum of four per
cent. This might be arising from professional investors following cash flow maximisation
strategies, and therefore setting maximum rent increases allowed by the regulations where
feasible. This finding appears to be in line with hypothesis H4b.
31
Rental Inflation
Table 12: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates - Relative Risk Ratios
(1)
∆Rijt < 0
RPZjt 0.847∗
(0.071)
RPZjt× Company 1.241
(0.181)
∆Rijt = 0
RPZjt 1.000
(.)
RPZjt× Company 1.000
(.)
0 < ∆Rijt < 4
RPZjt 2.332∗∗∗
(0.212)
RPZjt× Company 0.861
(0.110)
∆Rijt = 4
RPZjt 3.556∗∗∗
(0.341)
RPZjt× Company 1.490∗∗
(0.184)
∆Rijt > 4
RPZjt 0.524∗∗∗
(0.025)
RPZjt× Company 1.159+
(0.099)
Observations 51,950
LEA FE Yes
Month FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To summarise, our estimates indicate that differences exist in the reaction to the
regulations depending on whether the landlord is a company or an individual. We find
that individual landlords are more likely to set prices unchanged after the regulations.
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This behaviour might arise from these landlords being less likely to be able to carry
tenant turnover costs, having an valued tenancy relationship with the occupier or being
less financially sophisticated than a professional company. We also find that companies
are more likely to set prices at the regulatory maximum (relative to no-change) which
would be in line with professional cash flow management practises.
5.3.2 Did the Initial Rent Level Matter?
The final characteristic that we explore is whether the level of the initial rent matters for
the price setting behaviour of landlords after the regulations. Our intuition behind using
this split of the data is that some landlords who did not anticipate the regulations may
have been setting rents at a below current market rate to keep a good tenant with a view
to increase rents sharply when the tenant leaves. Once the regulations came into force, this
is no longer an option and such landlords would have to increase by the maximum in an
attempt to catch up.11 In relation to our exploration of nominal rigidity, this suggests that
landlords who change rents lower than the average in their area (hedonically controlling
for property type) prior to the introduction of the regulations, should be less likely to
keep prices nominally rigid and more likely to have higher growth rates at or below 4 per
cent relative to those who charged higher rents. This can be summarised in the following
hypotheses:
H5a: Nominal rigidity increases more for properties with above average rent levels.
H5b: Below average rental properties are more likely than above average rent properties
to set growth at the regulatory maximum.
To test whether this is the case, we exploit the panel nature of our data. For each
property, we compute the ratio of the rent in the period closest to (but before) the regu-
lation implementation, and the average rent in the quarter the tenancy commenced in the
local electoral area where it is located. A value of 1 for this ratio indicates the property
rent equals the average in the local electoral area in that quarter. A histogram of these
values is presented in Figure 8, which appears to be normally distributed. Using the values
pre-implementation ensures that the ratio is not endogenous to the growth rate, from the
perspective of simultaneity bias.
11Anecdotal information from the market in Ireland suggested this was a reasonably common
phenomenon.
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Figure 8: Growth Rate Distributions - Treatment Areas - By Rent Level
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We then create a binary indicator which distinguishes rents that are below the average
from those at or above the average. We then use this indicator and interact it with our
main RPZ dummy. The results of the assessment of nominal rigidity are presented in
Table 13. We find that the RPZ implementation effect is negative and significant and that
the interaction is positive and significant. This suggests that all the increase in nominal
rigidity after the regulations was driven by those landlords who had higher than average
rents before the regulations were introduced. We posit that this group was likely to be
more satisfied with the higher rent level they charged, whereas those landlords who set
rents at lower than the average were more likely forced to increase rents to attempt to
bring rents towards the average. The marginal effect would suggest these landlords are
actually less likely to keep prices rigid after the regulations.
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Table 13: Impact on Nominal Rigidity by Initial Rent Level
(1)
RPZjt -0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
RPZjt × Above Average 0.121∗∗∗
(0.008)
MFX of RPZjt for:
Below Average -0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
Above 0.083∗∗∗
(0.007)
Observations 52296
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Table 14 we estimate the impacts, relative to nominal rigidity, across the price
distribution, including again the interaction effect for those landlords who changed rents
greater than the average. We find that landlords who charged above average rents were
less likely to have positive growth rates across the distribution and more likely to have
falling rents after the regulations.
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Table 14: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates - Relative Risk Ratios
(1)
∆Rijt < 0
RPZjt 0.792∗
(0.086)
RPZjt × Above Average 1.293∗
(0.141)
∆Rijt = 0
RPZjt Base
(.)
RPZjt × Above Average Base
(.)
0 < ∆Rijt < 4
RPZjt 2.569∗∗∗
(0.276)
RPZjt × Above Average 0.816∗
(0.077)
∆Rijt = 4
RPZjt 4.482∗∗∗
(0.500)
RPZjt × Above Average 0.722∗∗∗
(0.066)
∆Rijt > 4
RPZjt 1.145∗
(0.071)
RPZjt × Above Average 0.290∗∗∗
(0.018)
Observations 52,296
LEA FE Yes
Month FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Time Gap Controls Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Our findings therefore suggest that the level of the initial rent did matter for landlords’
response to the regulations. Those landlords with rents that were below their area’s rents
in the period before the regulations were less likely to keep growth rates nominally rigid
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and also more likely to increase rents just below, at or above the 4 per cent cap. The lower
rents may have been driven by good relationships with tenants or inertia with a view to
increased rents in the future. However, the regulations are likely to have led to some
such landlords pricing in the maximum allowable increases to compensate for previous low
growth rates.
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper explores the impact of rent control regulations on rental price inflation, as well
as on nominal rigidity in housing rents. Our research objective is therefore two-fold. First,
using a difference-in-difference approach, we try to isolate the effect of the introduction of
rent controls on rent inflation in Ireland. Given the exemptions allowed in the regulation,
as well as potential non-compliance, we also analyse whether the regulations affected the
share of rents growing above the 4 per cent cap imposed in the Irish legislation. Our
second research objective focuses on analysing the effects of rent controls on the degree of
nominal rigidity. In order to test these effects empirically, we focus first on changes in the
share of zero growth rents. Afterwards, using a multinomial logit model, we explore the
impacts across the price distribution.
A number of findings emerge. We find that overall rent controls had a deflationary
impact, with the rental inflation rate dropping by approximately 2-3 percentage points
after the introduction of the regulations. We also find a considerable fall in the share of
rent price increases above the 4 per cent limit imposed by the regulatory framework. These
findings indicate that the regulations have been effective to a certain extent in lowering the
level of rental inflation in the areas of the country where rent controls were implemented.
In relation to the impact of rent controls on nominal rigidity, we find evidence point-
ing to both increases and decreases of rigidity. First, the share of zero growth contracts
increased after the introduction of the measures. This might be consistent with the regu-
latory structure implemented in Ireland, which does not allow rent resets between tenants.
Therefore, the increase in zero growth rent agreements may arise due to the risk of tenants
leaving under a rent increase and such costs not being recoupable, resulting in increases in
nominal rigidity. Second, the findings of the multinomial estimates present an more com-
plete picture of the impacts of rent controls across the price distribution. The estimates
indicate that rents were more likely to stay unadjusted after the implementation of rent
controls, as opposed to increase above the 4 per cent threshold. However, the estimates
also suggest that the regulations have increased the share of contracts with inflation at or
below the regulatory limit. This indicates that many landlords may have increased the
rents in an effort to profit maximise (maximise the real value of tenancies) given their
inability to reset rents outside exceptional circumstances under the framework. Therefore,
while the overall effect of the policies has been to dampen rents, they have also caused
inflation at other points in the distribution consistent with a protection of real return by
landlords.
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We find differences by landlord type with non-professional investors (individual house-
holds) more likely to have nominally rigid rents and also less likely to have increases at, or
below, the maximum allowable. This may be driven by the fact that such households are
unable to absorb tenant turnover costs as easy as professional companies. We also find
that landlords with lower than average rents before the regulations are less likely to leave
rents unchanged and more likely to grow rents up to the regulatory maximum after the
regulations. If such landlords had left rents low before, with a view to increasing the level
when they brought a new tenant in, this is no longer allowed. They therefore set the price
growth close to the maximum to compensate.
This research has interesting policy implications. First, our evidence suggests that
while rent controls can be effective in dampening house price inflation, the effect is not
uniform across the distribution. Indeed, some tenants, who previously enjoyed nominal
rent freezes, may face rent rises up to the regulatory maximum allowance as landlords look
to protect real returns. Two elements of the scheme calibration are therefore important to
reflect upon. The Irish rent controls, which do not allow a rent change between tenancies,
may be the reason landlords see the requirement to protect real returns. Rent restrictions
which do not share this feature may not experience this inflationary impact. Second, the
increase in the share of rent increases at the regulatory maximum (in this case 4 per cent)
highlights the fact that the parameterisation of this element is considerably important.
Policy makers should carefully consider the numerical parameter that is set as this will
be essential in guiding behaviour. Regular reviews of this parameter based on granular
data would be important, in particular, where rent control price allowances interact with
inflation rates and Central Bank inflation targets.
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Appendices
A RPZ designation dates by LEA in Ireland
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Designation round Date
County Dublin
Dublin City Council 1 December/2016
Cabra-Finglas
Ballymun
North Inner City
Beaumont-Donaghmede
Clontarf
Ballyfermot-Drimnagh
Crumlin-Kimmage
Rathgar-Rathmines
Pembroke-South Dock
South Dublin County Council 1 December/2016
Lucan
Clondalkin
Templeogue-Terenure
Tallaght Central
Tallaght South
Rathfarnham
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council 1 December/2016
Glencullen-Sandyford
Dundrum
Stillorgan
Blackrock
Dun Laoghaire
Killiney-Shankill
Fingal County Council 1 December/2016
Balbriggan
Swords
Castleknock
Mulhuddart
Howth - Malahide
County Galway
Galway city 2 January/2017
Galway City Central
Galway City East
Galway City West
County Cork
Cork City Council 1 December/2016
Cork City North-Central
Cork City North-East
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Cork City North-West
Cork City South-Central
Cork City South-East
Cork City South-West
Ballincollig-Carrigaline 2 January/2017
Cobh 3 March/2017
County Kildare
Maynooth 3 March/2017
Celbridge-Leixlip 2 January/2017
Naas 2 January/2017
Kildare-Newbridge 2 January/2017
County Meath
Ashbourne 2 January/2017
Laytown-Bettystown 2 January/2017
Ratoath 2 January/2017
County Wicklow
Bray 2 January/2017
Wicklow 2 January/2017
Greystones 4 September/2017
County Louth
Drogheda 4 September/2017
B Additional Summary Statistics
Data Split: Landlord Type - Before and After Treatment
Landlord Type Before After Total
Individual 34,122 11,278 45,400
Company 4,602 1,949 6,551
Total 38,724 13,227 51,951
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